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Abstract
This dissertation investigates individuals' college choice and dropout behavior in the market for vocational
training, specifically in response to a recently proposed financial aid regulation. Vocational training is an
important component of the postsecondary education arena and has been promoted by political leaders as an
option for high school graduates who do not wish to attend traditional 4 year colleges. The major players in
this market are for-profit colleges and community colleges, both of which offer open admission and mainly
confer certificates and associate degrees. This paper evaluates the implications of a regulation proposed by the
Obama administration to restrict federal student financial aid to for-profit colleges. Specifically, I examine the
effect of this policy change on students' college enrollment and college retention. To that end, I develop and
estimate a two-period discrete choice model of differentiated products, where the products are vocational
colleges. In the first period, forward-looking and risk-neutral individuals choose a vocational college to attend
or the outside option of no college. In the second period, those who are enrolled in a college decide whether
or not to drop out of school upon learning more about their postgraduation outcomes. I estimate this model
using Generalized Methods of Moments with school-level data collected from the Department of Education.
Model estimates reveal heterogeneous preference across demographic groups and several differentiating
factors between for-profit colleges and community colleges. I find that for-profit college enrollment is highly
responsive to federal student financial aid availability and that most of those who attend for-profit colleges
would rather forgo college altogether than substitute to community colleges. Counterfactual simulations
reveal that the proposed regulation would be successful at steering students away from for-profit colleges, as
intended by policy makers, but an unintended consequence of the regulation is that 77% of those who would
have otherwise gone to for-profit colleges would rather choose the no college option than the community
college option. This would amount to a net decline of 15% in college enrollment in the market for vocational
training. Furthermore, I find that for those who would substitute from for-profit colleges to community
colleges in response to the proposed regulation, their dropout probabilities on average would increase by 24
percent points due to mismatch.
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ABSTRACT
THE INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
REGULATING FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES: A MODEL OF
COLLEGE CHOICE AND RETENTION
YinYin Yu
Hanming Fang
This dissertation investigates individuals’ college choice and dropout behavior in the market
for vocational training, specifically in response to a recently proposed financial aid regula-
tion. Vocational training is an important component of the postsecondary education arena
and has been promoted by political leaders as an option for high school graduates who
do not wish to attend traditional 4 year colleges. The major players in this market are
for-profit colleges and community colleges, both of which offer open admission and mainly
confer certificates and associate degrees. This paper evaluates the implications of a reg-
ulation proposed by the Obama administration to restrict federal student financial aid to
for-profit colleges. Specifically, I examine the effect of this policy change on students’ col-
lege enrollment and college retention. To that end, I develop and estimate a two-period
discrete choice model of differentiated products, where the products are vocational colleges.
In the first period, forward-looking and risk-neutral individuals choose a vocational college
to attend or the outside option of no college. In the second period, those who are enrolled
in a college decide whether or not to drop out of school upon learning more about their
postgraduation outcomes. I estimate this model using Generalized Methods of Moments
with school-level data collected from the Department of Education. Model estimates reveal
v
heterogeneous preference across demographic groups and several differentiating factors be-
tween for-profit colleges and community colleges. I find that for-profit college enrollment
is highly responsive to federal student financial aid availability and that most of those who
attend for-profit colleges would rather forgo college altogether than substitute to community
colleges. Counterfactual simulations reveal that the proposed regulation would be success-
ful at steering students away from for-profit colleges, as intended by policy makers, but an
unintended consequence of the regulation is that 77% of those who would have otherwise
gone to for-profit colleges would rather choose the no college option than the community
college option. This would amount to a net decline of 15% in college enrollment in the
market for vocational training. Furthermore, I find that for those who would substitute
from for-profit colleges to community colleges in response to the proposed regulation, their
dropout probabilities on average would increase by 24 percent points due to mismatch.
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1 Introduction
For-profit colleges are postsecondary institutions that primarily provide vocational train-
ing through certificate and associate degree programs1. Their main competitors are commu-
nity colleges, and like community colleges, for-profit colleges have no admission standards.
I refer to the market in which for-profit and community colleges operate as the market for
postsecondary vocational training2. Vocational training occupies an important space in the
higher education arena for those who seek a more specialized and career-oriented educa-
tion. Compared to traditional 4 year colleges, vocational schools tend to attract a student
population that is of lower socioeconomic status and lower ability. In recent years, political
leaders have advocated vocational training as an option for those who do not wish to pursue
a traditional 4 year Bachelor’s degree34.
Although for-profit colleges have existed since colonial times as trade schools and ap-
prenticeships, they have become a major player in the higher education arena only within
the past decade. From 2000 to 2010, undergraduate enrollment at for-profit colleges grew
by 400%, compared to 30% growth at public colleges and 20% growth at private non-profit
colleges over the same period (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015c). Currently,
for-profit colleges account for 12% of the total undergraduate enrollment in the US. How-
ever, these institutions have also attracted much scrutiny from policy makers due to their
high tuition, significant reliance on federal student financial aid, and considerable federal
1Well-known examples of for-profit colleges include University of Phoenix, DeVry University, ITT Tech,
Strayer University, etc.
2Examples of vocational programs include massage therapy, stenography, dental hygiene, etc.
3https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education/building-american-skills-through-
community-colleges
4https://marcorubio.com/issues-2/marco-rubio-position-higher-education-policy-college/
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student loan default rates (United States Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee, 2012)5. In response to these criticism and to combat high federal student loan
default rates among for-profit college students, the Obama administration has recently pro-
posed to regulate for-profit colleges by restricting their students’ access to federal student
financial aid (Pell grants and federal student loans). The intention of this regulation is to
steer students away from for-profit colleges that are likely to leave them heavily in debt and
unable to repay their student loans, and toward cheaper community colleges that offer the
same programs.
The proposed regulation is a related to a broader public debate over the role that for-
profit college play in the higher education arena. Opponents of for-profit higher education
accuse these institutions of gaming federal student financial aid to support their exorbitant
tuition, a significant amount of which is kept as profit rather than spent on students6.
Critics have called for-profit colleges scams that charge a much higher tuition for the same
programs that can be found at community colleges. On the other hand, proponents of for-
profit higher education argue that these colleges target a niche student population that would
not otherwise attend community colleges; therefore, without for-profit colleges, a significant
portion of the student population would be left without a viable college option.
In this paper, I address some of the claims made in the public debate over for-profit
higher education and evaluate the effects of the proposed regulation on students’ college
choice and dropout behavior in the market for postsecondary vocational training. To this
end, I use a revealed preference approach to uncover demand parameters from students’
5Although for-profit colleges only serve 12% of the undergraduate population, they are responsible for
45% of all federal student loan defaults.
6According to a 2 year investigation into 30 large for-profit colleges conducted by the Senate Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee published in 2012, on average these schools keep 19.4% of revenue
as profit while only spending 17.2% on instructions.
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enrollment and dropout behavior. More specifically, I develop a novel two-period discrete
choice model of differentiated products that is a modified version of Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) and Petrin (2002), and I estimate this model using a school-level dataset
that I have assembled on vocational colleges. In the first period, risk neutral and forward-
looking individuals choose among vocational colleges in their choice sets based on school
characteristics, tuition, and financial aid availability. They also have the outside option of
not attending college. At this stage, individuals know their lifetime payoffs for not attending
college but are uncertain about the payoffs associated with graduating from each college in
their choice sets. In the second period, those who are enrolled in a college learn more about
their schools and their individual payoffs from graduating from their respective colleges.
With this information in hand, students then decide whether to stay in school and graduate
or to drop out. Upon making this decision, students receive their corresponding lifetime
payoffs net any student loan repayments. My model accounts for heterogeneous preferences
among different demographic groups and is able to capture in detail the financial aid process,
which is a key element in the market for postsecondary vocational training.
Estimation results show that for-profit college enrollment is very responsive to federal
student financial aid availability, and that these schools are indeed serving a niche student
population that does not find community colleges to be a reasonable alternative. Using
model estimates, I conduct the following counterfactual experiments: 1) restrict for-profit
college students’ access to federal student financial aid in terms of Pell grants and federal
student loans, and 2) close down all for-profit colleges. Counterfactual simulations indicate
that denying for-profit college students access to federal student financial aid would result
in a 74% drop in for-profit college enrollment. Of those who leave for-profit colleges, 77%
3
would rather abandon college plans altogether than substitute to cheaper community col-
leges. Overall, my results indicate that the proposed regulation would induce a 15% decrease
in college enrollment in the market for postsecondary vocational training. In addition, for
those who would switch to a community college in response to the regulation, I find that
their dropout rates on average would increase by 24 percentage points due to mismatch.
Counterfactual simulations also reveal that for-profit colleges target a niche student popu-
lation that is more likely to be female, black, older and lower-income than those who would
attend community colleges.
Estimated preference parameters illustrate significant heterogeneity among prospective
students from different demographic groups. The existence of such heterogeneity explains
for-profit colleges’ ability to target a niche student population. Furthermore, I find that,
from prospective students’ point of view, for-profit colleges and community college are dif-
ferentiated beyond tuition and program offerings. In particular, preference estimates reveal
that for-profit colleges are more effective with their instructional expenditure in terms of
attracting new enrollment and that they have comparative advantages in certain programs
relative to community colleges. I also find that prospective students derive more utility from
community colleges when they are in school but they see for-profit colleges as better in offer-
ing higher post-graduation payoffs and higher graduation rates, conditional on observables.
Higher graduation rates is particularly important in the market of vocational training as
most vocational jobs require the relevant certifications or degrees.
This paper builds upon the nascent but growing literature on for-profit colleges. Most
of the existing studies have focused on examining post-graduation labor market outcomes of
for-profit college students using individual-level data (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012; Deming
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et al. 2012; Lang and Weinstein 2013; Liu and Belfield 2014), or on evaluating the effect of
government aid on for-profit colleges’ tuition (Cellini 2009, 2010; Cellini and Goldin 2014).
My paper aims to understand students’ college choice and dropout decisions in the market
for postsecondary vocational training.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to address policy questions regarding
for-profit higher education. A unique advantage of my modeling framework is its ability to
accommodate large for-profit colleges’ multi-state or national operations, including online
programs. This allows me to study the for-profit college industry in its entirety rather than
only focusing on local schools within specific states as done in previous works. Being able
to model the operations of large for-profit colleges is particularly important as these schools
constitute the bulk of for-profit college enrollment. Another attractive feature of my model
is that it accounts for the non-pecuniary benefits of college. Most of the existing literature
on the labor market returns to for-profit higher education find no wage difference from those
of community colleges despite the sizable difference in tuition. This result alludes to the
presence of non-pecuniary benefits.
My paper is also related to a much broader literature on the relationship between credit
constraint and college enrollment (e.g., Keane and Wolpin 2001; Cameron and Taber 2004;
Epple et al. 2004). Contrary to my results, most of the papers in this literature find the effect
of credit constraint on college enrollment to be small. This difference in results is due to the
fact that most papers in this literature study selective 4 year institutions whose students
come from a higher socioeconomic stratum or cheap community colleges. In contrast, for-
profit colleges students are of much lower socioeconomic status and the only means for
them to finance their expensive for-profit education is through federal student financial aid.
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Counterfactual experiments reveal that credit constraint can result in a significant decline
in college enrollment in the market for postsecondary vocational training.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the available data
and presents some stylized facts that motivate the model specification. Section 3 presents
the model. Section 4 discusses model predictions and the estimation method. Section 5
presents the empirical specification. Section 6 reports the estimation results and model fit.
Section 7 presents counterfactual analyses. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Data
The main source of data used in this paper is the Integrated Postsecondary Educa-
tion Data System (IPEDS). IPEDS conducts a series of surveys each year for all the Title
IV (federal student financial aid) eligible postsecondary institutions in the US7. I extract
from these surveys data on school name/type, program offerings, new student enrollment,
graduation count, number of students that continued onto the next school year, student
demographics in terms of age, gender and race, and financial aid in terms of Pell/non-Pell
grants and federal student loans for all schools within my sample.8 All data from IPEDS are
at the school level. I match IPEDS data to campus location data from the Postsecondary
7I draw data from the following surveys conducted by IPEDS: Institutional Characteristics, 12-Month
Enrollment, Fall Enrollment, Completion, Finance, and Student Financial Aid.
8New student enrollment and student demographics are constructed by extrapolating the percentage of
new students and the demographic distribution from the Fall enrollment survey to the 12 months enrollment
survey. Surveys are matched first by UNITID and non-matches are then matched by their main OPEIDs.
IPEDS defines an observation by its UNITID but a school can have multiple UNITID’s if it has multiple
campuses. A school with multiple campuses can either report data for each of its campuses separately or
report aggregate data for groups of campuses in a parent/child relationship, in which multiple UNITID’s
are matched to the same aggregate data. Parent/child relationships differ across surveys. In my sample,
a school with multiple UNITID’s are disaggregated into the finest set of groups such that the UNITID’s
in each group do not share parent/child aggregate reporting relationships with the UNITID’s of any other
group, and that each group has non-overlapping service areas with other groups. In the case where a school
can be disaggregated into multiple groups as previously described, each group is considered a separate school
in my sample.
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Education Participants System (PEPS) in order to pinpoint the physical presence of schools
with multiple campus locations.9
I further supplement school data with demographics data from the American Community
Survey (ACS) and the Census. I use the ACS to estimate an empirical distribution of family
income adjusted by family size (famincpp = family income per person) as a function of
the demographics I observe in IPEDS. I simulate draws of famincpp from this distribution
conditional on observed demographics in order to integrate out famincpp during estimation
as it is unobserved in the school dataset. Different schools face different income distributions
because they attract different student demographics. The Census is mainly used to construct
market size and demographic distributions at the Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) level.
I combine data from the aforementioned surveys to construct a cross-sectional data set for
the 2009-2010 school year, which marked the height of the for-profit college industry10.
3 Sample Description
The set of schools included in my sample are all Title IV-eligible institutions with no
admission standards that are operating in the 2009-2010 school year 11. This group consists
of 2,228 schools, of which 972 are for-profit, 1,140 are public, and 116 are private non-profit.
9This match is done by main OPEID.
10I opted for a cross-sectional approach rather than a panel data approach because for-profit colleges are
created, closed, and bought/sold to other for-profit colleges on a fairly frequent basis. On top of that, IPEDS
does not keep track of schools that change ownership or had to reapply for Title IV funding for some reason;
in these cases, the school would have a new identifier and there is no direct way for it to be connected to its
entry in previous rounds of surveys.
11For-profit and community colleges do not have admission standards. These schools are inherently
different from selective traditional 4 year institutions not only in entrance requirements but also in the type
of education they offer. I assume that students interested in for-profit colleges would not be interested
in selective traditional 4 year institutions and vice versa. This assumption is validated by the fact that
most selective traditional 4 year institutions do not accept credit transfers from for-profit colleges. On the
other hand, some selective traditional 4 year institutions do accept credit transfers from community colleges.
But since I am mainly concerned about the substitution patterns of for-profit college students, I can safely
preclude selective traditional 4 year institutions from my choice set of schools.
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For the rest of this paper, I will refer to the public and private non-profit colleges in my
sample as peer colleges because they are the relevant peer group to for-profit colleges. The
set of individuals I include in my market size definition are those ages 18-44 who have at
least a high school diploma but less than a Bachelor’s degree.
For-profit colleges are systematically different from peer colleges in several dimensions,
as shown in tables 1 and 2. In terms of enrollment, for-profit colleges on average are smaller
than peer colleges. The average enrollment at for-profit colleges is 1,666 compared to 3,439
at peer colleges12 13. For-profit college students on average are more likely to be female,
black, and older than peer college students, which motivates the possibility that for-profit
colleges may be serving a niche student population. In terms of program offerings, for-profit
colleges on average are more specialized and offer fewer programs than peer colleges, which
tend to offer a full spectrum of programs, and every program offered by for-profit colleges
can be found at peer colleges. The average number of programs is 5 (median 4) at for-profit
colleges, whereas the average number of programs is 38 (median 34) at peer colleges.
Another point of differentiation between the two types of colleges is in graduation rates;
for-profit colleges on average offer higher graduation rates than peer colleges. The only
official graduation rate/dropout rate available is for first-time, full-time students, but this
population is not representative of the students in the market for postsecondary vocational
training; in fact, some colleges in my sample do not have any first-time, full-time students.
Therefore, I opt to construct my own measure of graduation rate. Figure 1 illustrates the
flow of students in and out of a school in years t and t+1, where STotalt is the total enrollment
12Although there are a handful of for-profit colleges with nationwide presence that have much higher
enrollment than the typical peer college.
13I define enrollment as those who are degree/certificate-seeking. Students who casually take classes
without an objective of pursuing a degree or a certificate are not counted as part of enrollment or market
share. Part-time degree-seeking students are counted as one half of a full-time student.
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of this school in year t, SNewt is the number of new students entering in year t, Ct is the
number of students who were enrolled in year t and continued on to the next school year,
Gt is the number of students who graduated with a degree or certificate in year t, and Dt is
the number of students who dropped out in year t; all except Dt is observed. To construct
the graduation rate, I assume steady state in the proportion of graduates and dropouts each
year. More specifically, I define the graduation rate as the percentage of graduates (G) out
of those who did not continue onto the next school year (STotal − C); i.e.
graduation rate =
G
STotal − C
dropout rate = 1− G
STotal − C .
(1)
In my sample the average graduation rate is much higher at for-profit colleges (51%) than
at peer colleges (30%). This pattern is consistent with the official graduation rates of the
first-time, full-time population.
The values of my constructed graduation rate/dropout rate are in line with a similarly
defined dropout rate that is documented in the Senate HELP Committee report on a two
year (2008-2010) investigation into 30 large for-profit colleges (United States Senate Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 2012). The average graduation rate in my
sample is 40%, which is also very similar to the 34% average graduation rate among first-
time, full-time Bachelor’s degree-seeking students at 4 year institutions with no admission
standards for the 2007 cohort as reported by the National Center for Education Statistics
(2015b).14 In order to parse out differences in graduation rates due to program offerings and
student composition, I estimate a linear probability model of graduation rates the results
14Graduation is defined by the National Center for Education Statistics as the percentage who graduated
within 6 years.
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of which are presented in table 5. After controlling for all observables, for-profit colleges
still have significantly higher graduation rates, on average by 7 percentage points, than peer
colleges. This finding is consistent with for-profit colleges’ profit-maximization objective as
these institutions have a monetary incentive to keep students in school for as long as possible
(till graduation) in order to extract the maximum amount of tuition from them.
A key element in the market for postsecondary vocation training is the financial aid
process. I observe federal student financial aid in terms of Pell grants and student loans,
as well as non-Pell grants which include institutional grants and state/local grants15. In
the 2009-2010 school year, 76% of for-profit college students took out federal student loans
and 61% received Pell grants; this is significantly higher than the federal student financial
aid uptake rate for peer college students, which are 23% and 39% respectively. Not only do
more for-profit college students receive federal student financial aid, they receive a higher
amount conditional on receiving it. However, for-profit colleges students on average receive
less non-Pell grants; this is most likely because for-profit colleges rarely give out institutional
grants and sometimes they are not eligible for state/local grants.
Part of the difference in federal student financial aid uptake between for-profit college
students and peer college students is due to the higher tuition charged by for-profit colleges.
On average, for-profit college students pay $8,684 in tuition, compared to $2,769 for peer col-
lege students. However, the average out-of-pocket expenditure of for-profit college students
(-$1,201) is lower than that of peer college students (-$871)16. I further investigate the dif-
ference in financial aid uptake between for-profit college students and peer college students
15Another source of financial aid is private loans, which is not observed in my data but they only account
for 7.2% of the student loan market.
16Students can borrow more than tuition in order to cover to living expenses. In particular, students are
free to borrow unsubsidized federal student loans up to the maximum limit.
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by controlling for tuition and student composition in a series of reduced form regressions pre-
sented in tables 3 and 4. Regression estimates suggest that even after controlling for tuition
and student composition, for-profit college students on average are more likely to receive
federal student financial aid (Pell grants and loans) and receive a higher amount conditional
on receiving it. These results are consistent with the fact that for-profit colleges advertise
the amount of financial aid their students receive and that they commonly provide hands-on
assistance to students on federal student financial aid applications (New York Times, 2014).
Bettinger, Oreopoulos, and Sanbonmatsu (2012) find that helping low-income individuals
with the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and providing them with in-
formation on financial aid in relation to tuition costs are very effective in increasing federal
student financial aid uptake, as well as encouraging college enrollment and persistence. Re-
gression estimates also show that even after controlling for tuition and student composition,
for-profit college students receive lower non-Pell grants than peer college students.
Despite charging much higher tuition, for-profit colleges on average spend as much on
students as peer colleges, but they tend to spend less on instructions and more on non-
instructional items. One of the standing criticisms of for-profit colleges is that they spend
too little on student instructions, which is usually considered a proxy for education quality.
4 Model
I develop a two-period discrete choice model of differentiated products to capture s-
tudents’ college choice and subsequent dropout decisions in the market for postsecondary
vocational training. In the first period, individuals choose a college within their choice sets
to attend; they also have the outside option of not attending college; in the second period,
11
those who are enrolled in a school decide whether to continue and graduate or to drop out of
college. Upon making the dropout decision, students receive the corresponding discounted
lifetime payoffs; they are also liable to start repayment on their student loans upon leaving
school.
4.1 School Choice
In the first period, individual i chooses among the schools in his/her choice set or the
outside option of no school. At this stage, individual i knows his/her lifetime payoff from
not attending school, Y 0i , but is uncertain about the payoff associated with graduating from
school j, Y 1ij . I assume that the lifetime payoff for enrolling in a college but then dropping out
is also Y 0i
17. Here, lifetime payoff encompasses both earnings and non-pecuniary benefits. I
parameterize the distribution of Y 0i and Y
1
ij to be jointly normal
Y 1ij
Y 0i
 ∼ N

µ1ij
µ0i
 ,
 σ21 ρσ1σ0
ρσ1σ0 σ
2
0

 . (2)
which implies
Y 1ij |Y 0i ∼ N(µ1ij + ρ
σ1
σ0
(Y 0i − µ1ij), (1− ρ2)σ21)
Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i ∼ N(µ1ij + ρ
σ1
σ0
(Y 0i − µ1ij)− Y 0i , σ2Y )
(3)
where σ2Y ≡ (1 − ρ2)σ21. I further parameterize the expected return to graduating from
college as
17This is a reasonable assumption because most of the jobs that students pursue after receiving vocational
training require the relevant certification or degree; for example, in order for an individual to become a
physical therapist he must be certified. Therefore, the return to attending a vocational college but not
graduating is minimal.
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E(Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i ) = µ1ij + ρ
σ1
σ0
(Y 0i − µ1ij)− Y 0i
= µ1ij − ρ
σ1
σ0
µ1ij + (ρ
σ1
σ0
− 1)Y 0i
= X1j β
1
i + νj + β
0
i
= Xjβi + νj
(4)
where Xj ≡ [1, X1j ] and X1j is the set of school j’s characteristics that are observable to
the econometrician, coefficient vector βi = [β0i , β
1
i ] include β
0
i ≡ (ρσ1σ0 − 1)Y 0i and β1i which
describes individual i’s preference forX1j , and νj is a school-specific quality index that affects
students’ post-graduation payoffs but is unobserved by the econometrician; more specifically,
I adopt the parameterization µ1ij − ρσ1σ0µ1ij ≡ X1j β1i + νj18 19.
At the enrollment stage, I assume individuals observe Xj but do not observe νj , which
they learn after enrollment; instead, prospective students only observe ν¯τ for schools of type
τ . I assume rational expectation in the sense that ν¯τ = 1|τ |
∑
j∈τ νj . Therefore, individual i
perceives the lifetime return to graduating from school j ∈ τ as a draw from the following
distribution
18σY and νj are identified by school-level dropout rates. I opt to parameterize the dropout rate hetero-
geneity as heterogeneity in mean rather than variance because the variance captures individuals’ uncertainty
and is more aptly identified by individual-level or demographic-level dropout rates, which are not available.
Also, from a computational standpoint, allowing the variance σY to vary by school is exponentially more
difficult to estimate.
19I opt to parameterize the return to schooling as a function of observed school characteristics because I
do not observe post-graduation earnings. This parameterization is also justified by the fact that students do
not know of their post-graduation earnings at the school choice stage because college is an experience good;
instead they infer such information from the characteristics of the schools that they do observe. In October
2015, President Obama released College Scorecard, which is a website that contains various data elements
on Title-IV eligible postsecondary institutions, including the average post-graduation earning of students
who received any federal student financial aid. This resource became available too late to be included in the
current draft of this paper, but I fully intend to utilize the additional information from College Scorecard in
the next version of this paper.
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Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i ∼ N(Xjβi + ν¯τ , σ2Y ) (5)
Note that the realized lifetime return to graduating from college could be negative; as such,
individual i accounts for the possibility of dropping out in the second period when making
his/her school choice decision20. Let pij be individual i’s annual out-of-pocket cost (tuition
net financial aid) at college j, let Lnij be his/her net present value of loan repayments for
n years worth of federal student loans, and let r be the discount rate, then student i will
drop out of a two year program at college j after one year if the realized Y 1ij is such that the
benefit to graduating is not worth the additional cost; i.e.
− αipij − αiL2ij +
1
1 + r
Y 1ij < −αiL1ij +
1
1 + r
Y 0i , (6)
where αi is the price sensitivity coefficient. I abstract from modeling students’ wage in
school as I do not have data on how much students in this market work and their earnings.
Therefore, I assume that students make the same wage in school ws as they would while
not attending school w0; i.e., ws = w0. Since only the wage differential ws − w0 matters in
making enrollment and dropout decisions, without loss of generality, I omit the per-period
wage from my model specification for the duration of the program under consideration (in
this case the duration of the program under consideration is 2 years).
At the enrollment stage, individual i’s perceives that he/she will drop out from a 2 year
program in school j after the first year with probability
20I assume the dropout decision is made after one year.
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dpij = pr(−αipij − αiL2ij +
1
1 + r
Y 1ij < −αiL1ij +
1
1 + r
Y 0i |Y 0i , Xj , ν¯τ )
= Φ(
(1 + r)αi(p¯ij + L
2
ij − L1ij)− (Xjβi + ν¯τ )
σY
)
(7)
The distinction between the perceived dropout probability and the actual dropout prob-
ability is that the former is constructed using information known at the enrollment stage
whereas the actual dropout decision is made based on the post-enrollment information set.
In particular, the perceived dropout probability is constructed using ν¯τ , while the actual
dropout probability is constructed using νj , which is only observed post-enrollment and
supplants the ex-ante noisy measure ν¯τ .
When making their school choice decision, prospective students also know the grants gij
and loans lij they would receive for attending each school in their choice sets. Grants can
take the form of Pell grants gpij or non-Pell grants g
np
ij , and loans are federal student loans.
21
The annual gij and lij individual i receives from attending school j are
gij = pr(g
p
ij > 0)E(g
p
ij |gpij > 0) + E(gnpij )
lij = pr(lij > 0)E(lij |lij > 0)
(8)
where I parameterize each component of the grant and loan functions by school type (for-
profit or peer), tuition pj , and family income adjusted by family size (family income per-
person famincppi)
21From IPEDS, I observe at the school level the proportion of students with Pell grants, average annual
Pell grant for recipients, average annual non-Pell grants, the proportion of students with Federal student
loans, and average annual federal student loan for recipients. Private student loans are unobserved but they
only constitutes 7.2% of the student loan market.
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pr(gpij > 0) =
exp(Wijγ1)
1 + exp(Wijγ1)
E(gpij |gpij > 0) = min{exp(Wijγ2), $5, 350}
E(gnpij ) = exp(Wijγ3)
pr(lij > 0) =
exp(Wijλ1)
1 + exp(Wijλ1)
E(lij |lij > 0) = min{exp(Wijλ2), $12, 500}
(9)
where Wizj = [1 1(j is for-profit) log(pj) log(famincppi)], $5, 350 is the maximum
annual Pell grant, and $12, 500 is the maximum annual unsubsidized federal student loans
for independent students in the 2009-2010 school year. Individual i’s annual out-of-pocket
cost for attending school j is p¯ij = pj − gij − lij , and his/her net present value of loan
repayments Lnij is a function of lij and the number of years of loans taken n, which is the
program length.
I assume individuals are risk neutral and forward looking with respect to the dropout
probability. The utility individual i derives from attending a two-year program is
uij = −αip¯ij + δj + ij
+
1
1 + r
{(1− dpij)[−αip¯ij − αiL2ij +
1
1 + r
E(Y 1ij |Y 0i , Xj , ν¯τ , graduate)]
+ dpij(−αiL1ij +
1
1 + r
Y 0i )}
(10)
where δj is the flow utility students derive from enrolling in school j, which captures factors
such as the ease of applying and students’ in-school experience, and graduate refers to
the condition that the inequality in (6) holds. Everyone who attends school must pay the
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annual out-of-pocket cost p¯ij for the first year, but only those who wish to stay in school
and graduate would pay tuition for the remainder of the program. Also, those who decide to
drop out after one year are only liable to repay one year of student loans, whereas those who
decide to stay in school and graduate from a two year program must begin repayment on
two years of student loans upon graduation. Finally, the expected lifetime payoffs of those
who graduate is different from those of college dropouts.
On the other hand, the utility individual i derives from not attending college is
ui0 =
1
(1 + r)2
Y 0i + i0 (11)
where ij and i0 are distributed standard Type I extreme value.22 Therefore, the utility
gain individual i derives from attending college over the no college option is
uij − ui0 = −αip¯ij + δj + ij
+
1
1 + r
{(1− dpij)[−αip¯ij − αiL2ij +
1
1 + r
E(Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i , Xj , ν¯τ , graduate)]
+ dpij(−αiL1ij)}
(12)
where
E(Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i , Xj , ν¯τ , graduate) = Xjβi + ν¯τ + σY
φ(
(1+r)αi(p¯ij+L
2
ij−L1ij)−(Xjβi+ν¯τ )
σY
)
1− Φ( (1+r)αi(p¯ij+L
2
ij−L1ij)−(Xjβi+ν¯τ )
σY
)
(13)
22Recall that per-period wage is assumed to be same whether or not individuals are enrolled in a school for
the duration of the program under consideration; in this case, the program under consideration has a length
of two years and therefore Y 0i is discounted by 1(1+r)2 . Since only the difference between the per-period
wages matters, I omit them from my utility specification without loss of generality.
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Given the extreme value assumption, the probability individual i attends a two year program
in school j is
sij =
exp(Vij)
1 + Σk∈lexp(Vik)
(14)
where
Vij ≡ −αip¯ij + δj
+
1
1 + r
{(1− dpij)[−αip¯ij − αiL2ij +
1
1 + r
E(Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i , Xj , ν¯τ , graduate)]
+ dpij(−αiL1ij)}
(15)
4.2 Dropout Decision
If individual i decided to enroll in school j in the first period, then at the end of the
first year in college he/she will decide whether to drop out or to stay for the duration of the
program and graduate. Post-enrollment, individual i learns of the lifetime return Y 1ij − Y 0i
to graduating from college j, which is a draw from the following distribution
Y 1ij − Y 0i |Y 0i ∼ N(Xjβi + νj , σ2Y ). (16)
Note that νj is used instead of ν¯τ because νj is the true post-graduation quality index of
school j whereas ν¯τ is merely individual i’s perceived quality index under ex-ante uncertainty
in the school choice stage. Therefore, individual i’s actual dropout probability is
dij = pr(−αipij − αiL2ij +
1
1 + r
Y 1ij < −αiL1ij +
1
1 + r
Y 0i |Y 0i , Xj , νj)
= Φ(
(1 + r)αi(p¯ij + L
2
ij − L1ij)− (Xjβi + νj)
σY
)
(17)
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The randomness surrounding the realization of Y 1ij − Y 0i captures both the uncertainty
surrounding the return to schooling at the school choice stage and the idiosyncrasies of
outside opportunities. For example, a low realization of Y 1ij − Y 0i can be due to the student
discovering that his/her education is not as lucrative as he/she originally expected, or it can
be due to the student receiving a very attractive outside opportunity.
4.3 Market Definition
Students in the market for postsecondary vocational training only attend schools locally;
I take this fact into account by delineating an individual’s choice set as the set of schools
that are available in his/her Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA)23. A school’s service area
is the set of CBSAs in which it is available. With online offerings, defining a school’s service
area is less than obvious. I adopt the convention that a school’s service area is the set of
CBSAs in which it has at least one campus24. This definition is straightforward in the case of
community colleges as these schools are designed to serve local students, but I contend that
this is also a reasonable definition for for-profit colleges because even though theoretically
anyone in the United States can attend a school with online offerings, a large majority of
schools are much smaller in size than would be expected if they drew enrollment from all
over the country. Also, since some functions may have to be done on campus and students
may opt for a mixture of online and on-campus classes, it makes sense for smaller schools
to only advertise and be known in the surrounding communities. There are a few schools
that are exceptions to this rule and these are schools that are known to have extensive,
nation-wide online offerings, such as the University of Phoenix and DeVry University. The
23A CBSA is either a metropolitan statistical area or a micropolitan statistical area.
24For those campuses that are not located in any CBSAs, I assign them to the closest CBSA. The vast
majority of campuses are located in CBSAs
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enrollment counts at these schools are significantly greater than those of local colleges with
online offerings, and these schools also have campuses across the country. University of
Phoenix, for example, has around 200,000 undergraduate students and over 100 campuses
nationwide. For these exceptions, I designate their service areas to be all the CBSAs in my
sample, regardless of their campus locations; there are 26 schools in my sample that fall
under this exception.
I include a CBSA in my sample if it contains at least one campus from the schools in
my sample. There is a total of 852 CBSAs in my sample; all have both for-profit and peer
options. The average number of schools in a CBSA is 30, the median is 28.
5 Model Predictions, Estimation Strategy, and Identification
Since I only observe data at the school-level, all model predicted moments must be
aggregated to the school-level in order to be matched to the observed data. I follow Petrin
(2002) in using demographic-level micro-shares (demographic-specific market shares) to aid
in estimation, in addition to matching the school market shares. Only new degree/certificate-
seeking student enrollment is used towards calculating market shares25. The set of data
moments I match include school market shares and school dropout rate, as well as moments
involving school demographic-specific market shares and school grant and loan function
components as described in (9).
25Community colleges are known to attract students who only enroll to attend a few classes but not
necessarily with the objective of obtaining a degree or certificate. These students are not considered
degree/certificate-seeking and are not included in my sample.
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5.1 Model Predictions
School j’s predicted market share is computed as the weighted average of its predicted
market share in each CBSA within its service area, where the weights are the market sizes
Mc of the CBSAs c. More specifically,
sj =
Σc∈jMc
∫ ∫
sij(X, δ, θ1i)dGˆ(famincppi|θ1i)dFc(θ1i)
Σc∈jMc
(18)
where sij is as defined in (14) and θ1i ≡ {βi, σi, σY , ν¯τ , γ1, γ2, γ3, λ1, λ2}. The inner integral
is taken over the empirical distribution of family income adjusted by family size famincpp
for individual i given his observed demographics26. The outer integral is taken over βi which
is a deterministic function of individuals’ observed demographics. Fc(θ1i) is the distribution
of observed demographics in CBSA c.
School j’s predicted demographic-specific market share for demographic z is computed
the same way as its predicted market share except the market sizes are restricted to those
of demographic z and the distributions Gˆ(famincppi|θ1i, z) and Fc(θ1i|z) are specific to
demographic group z; i.e.,
szj =
Σc∈jM zc
∫ ∫
sij(X, δ, θ1i)dGˆ(famincppi|θ1i, z)dFc(θ1i|z)
Σc∈jM zc
(19)
where M zc is the market size of demographic group z in CBSA c.
School j’s predicted dropout rate is computed as the weighted average of j’s predicted
dropout rate at the CBSA-level, where the CBSA-level dropout rate is calculated taking
into account selection as only those who attend school j can contribute to its dropout rate
26The observed demographics are race: black/non-black, sex, and age 18-24, 25-44.
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and different individuals have different dropout probabilities.27 Therefore, school j’s model
predicted dropout rate is
dj =
Σc∈jMc
∫ ∫ ∫
dij(X, θ2i)dSj(θ1i)dGˆ(famincppi|θ1i)dFc(θ1i)
Σc∈jMc
(20)
where dij is the actual dropout rate as defined in (17), the inner integral is integrating
over the distribution of students enrolled in school j in order to control for selection, and
θ2i ≡ {βi, σi, σY , νj , γ1, γ2, γ3, λ1, λ2}. The only difference between θ1i and θ2i is that the
former contains ν¯τ whereas the latter contains νj . Recall that the enrollment decision is
made based in ν¯τ whereas the dropout decision is made based on νj .
School j’s grant and loan function components taken to data are the five components
described in (9); i.e., pr(gpij > 0), E(g
p
ij |gpij > 0), E(gnpij ), pr(lij > 0), and E(lij |lij > 0).
The school-level model prediction for each of these components is computed in the same
way as the dropout rate, taking into account selection. For example, the model predicted
proportion of school j’s students with Pell grants is
pr(gpj > 0) =
Σc∈jMc
∫ ∫ ∫
pr(gpij > 0)dSj(θ1i)dGˆ(famincppi|θ1i)dFc(θ1i)
Σc∈jMc
(21)
where pr(gpij > 0) is defined in (9).
27The dropout rate here refers to the actual dropout rate and not the perceived dropout rate.
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5.2 Estimation Strategy
I estimate this model using GMM by supplementing school-level moments with demo-
graphic micromoments following Petrin (2002). The first set of data moments I match are
school market shares and school dropout rates. Matching these moments amounts to solving
for the vector of flow utilities students derive from enrolling in schools δ(θ1) and the vector
of post-graduation quality indices ν(θ1) such that the following equalities hold
sj(X, δ, θ1)− s∗j = 0, j = 1, ..., J
dj(X, δ, θ1, ν)− d∗j = 0, j = 1, ..., J
(22)
where sj(X, δ, θ1) is as in (18) and dj(X, δ, θ1, ν) is as in (20), and s∗ and d∗ are the observed
school market shares and school dropout rates, respectively. The existence and uniqueness
of δ(θ1) and ν(θ1) are proven in Berry (1994) under some mild regularity conditions.
The second set of data moments I match, M∗j , include demographic-specific market
shares and grant and loan function components; letMj(X, δ, θ1) denote the model-predicted
analog for M∗j
Mj(X, δ, θ1) = [s
z
j ∀z, pr(gpj > 0), E(gpj |gpj > 0), E(gnpj ), pr(lj > 0), E(lj |lj > 0)] (23)
For these moments I minimize the prediction error
εj(X, δ, θ1) = Mj(X, δ, θ1)−M∗j (24)
If the model captures the underlying data-generating process, then at the true parameter
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values δ∗, θ∗1
E(εj |X, δ∗, θ∗1) = 0 (25)
Consequently, let Zj be a vector of instruments that are independent of the prediction error,
then Zj is uncorrelated with εj at the true parameter values. Hence, I use
G(X, δ, θ1) = E(Zj ⊗ εj(X, δ, θ1)) (26)
as GMM moments and denote its sample analog as
GJ(X, δ, θ1) =
1
J
J∑
j=1
Zj ⊗ εj(X, δ, θ1). (27)
The GMM minimization problem is
minθ1 G(θ1)
′W−1G(θ1)
s.t. δ : sj(X, δ, θ1) = s
∗
j j = 1, ..., J
ν : dj(X, δ, θ1, ν) = d
∗
j j = 1, ..., J,
ν¯τ : ν¯τ =
1
|τ |Σj∈τνj ∀τ
(28)
The inner loop ensures that the vector of flow utilities students derive while in school δ
matches the predicted market shares to the observed market shares, and the vector of post-
graduation quality indices ν matches the predicted (actual) dropout rates to the observed
dropout rates28.
28Imposing the rational expectation assumption ν¯τ = 1|τ |Σj∈τνj ∀τ within the innerloop requires solving
a system of 2J equations in δj and νj simultaneously since sj(X, δ, θ1) is a function of νj through ν¯τ . Due to
the functional forms of sj(X, δ, θ1) and dj(X, δ, θ1, ν), this system of 2J equations and 2J unknowns does not
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I use two-step efficient GMM following Hansen (1982) to find the optimal weighting
matrix
W−1 = E(G(θˆ1)G(θˆ1)′)−1 (29)
where θˆ1 is a consistent estimate θ1. The asymptotic distribution of the two-step efficient
GMM estimator is
√
J(θGMM1 − θ∗1) ∼ N(0,Ω)
where Ω = [
∂G(θ∗1)
∂θ1
′
W−1
∂G(θ∗1)
∂θ1
]−1
(30)
5.3 Identification
I parameterize αi and βi to be deterministic functions of observed demographics z; i.e.,
αi =
∑
z
αz ∗ 1(i ∈ z),
βi =
∑
z
βz ∗ 1(i ∈ z),
(31)
therefore, these parameters are identified by the relationship between tuition and school
characteristics and demographic-specific market shares. Since individuals’ choice sets are
delineated by CBSA’s and there are 852 CBSA’s in my sample, the variation of school
have a unique solution. To remedy this problem, I impose the constraint ν¯τ = 1|τ |Σj∈τνj ∀τ in the outerloop
(in the GMM objective function) by punishing the difference between ν¯τ and 1|τ |Σj∈τνj . More specifically,
my GMM objective function becomes G(θ1)′W−1G(θ1) +λ(ν¯τ − 1|τ |Σj∈τνj)2, where λ is a positive constant
that is large relative to G(θ1)′W−1G(θ1) and acts like a Lagrange multiplier. This way, ν¯τ is estimated in
the outerloop whereas δj ’s and νj ’s are estimated in the innerloop given the value of ν¯τ from the previous
iteration of the outerloop. Doing so allows me to solve the system of J shares equations for δj ’s first, given
the value of ν¯τ from the previous iteration of the outer loop, since enrollment decisions are made based on
ν¯τ rather than νj ’s. Then I solve the system of dropout rate equations for νj ’s given δj ’s. Each of these
systems of J equations and J unknowns has a unique solution.
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choices and demographic distributions among different CBSA’s help identify the price and
preference parameters for tuition and school characteristics. Note that because αi and βi are
i-specific and estimated in the outer loop whereas the quality indices δj and νj are school-
specific and computed in the inner loop, each iteration of αi and βi are chosen given δj and
νj from the inner loop calculations, hence precluding the need of instruments for potentially
endogenous variables such as tuition. In other words, when using the demographic-specific
micromoments to identify αi and βi, the unobserved characteristics δj and νj can be treated
as observed by the econometrician since they are computed from the school market shares
and the school dropout rates.
The grant and loan function parameters {γ1, γ2, γ3, λ1, λ2} are identified by matching
model predicted grant and loan function components to their data counterparts. The vector
of flow utilities from enrollment δ explains the variation in market shares between schools
that have the same observables and the same dropout rates. The vector of post-graduation
quality indices ν explains the variation in dropout rates between schools with the same
shares and the same observables. The ex-ante perceived post-graduation quality indices ν¯τ ’s
are identified by the constraint that they should equal 1|τ |Σj∈τνj ,∀τ . Finally, σY is identified
by the relationship between dropout rate and observables.
6 Empirical Specification
In estimating the model, I follow the standard in estimating dynamic models by fixing
the discount rate r; I set the discount rate to 12%, which is the annual interest rate on
private student loans. In comparison, the annual interest rate on federal student loans is
set to that of Direct Unsubsidized Loans, 6.8%. Loan repayment is assumed to follow the
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standard 10 year fixed payment repayment plan where individuals pay a constant amount
each month for 10 years29.
I include the following elements in the vector of observed school characteristics Xj : a
constant term, s = per-student instructional spending, s*1(for−profit)= per-student instruc-
tional spending interacted for with for-profit indicator, e = per-student non-instructional
spending, 1(offer online courses), 1(offer <1 year certificate programs), 1(offer associate de-
gree programs), 1(offer 2-4 year certificate programs), 1(offer 2-4 year certificate programs)*1(for-
profit), 1(offer beauty programs), 1(offer allied health programs), 1(offer business programs),
1(offer business programs)*1(for-profit), total # of programs offered, average urbanization
level in percentage terms of the counties in which school j has campuses, average urban-
ization level in percentage terms of the counties in which school j has campuses interacted
with for-profit indicator, 1(for-profit). This combination was determined to be the best in
explaining variations in demographic-specific market shares in multinomial logit regressions,
the results of which are not included.
For the ex-ante expected post-graduation quality indices ν¯τ , I allow τ to take two values,
τ = L,H, which correspond to low dropout rates (below the median), and high dropout
rates (above the median) respectively. Finally, for the demographic-specific market shares,
I include the market shares of the following demographic groups: female, male, black, non-
black, ages 18-24, ages ≥25, black female, black male, females ages 18-24, males ages 18-24,
females ages ≥25, males ages ≥25.30 I allow each demographic group (female, male, black,
29I assume that students do not engage in strategic default; i.e., students take out loans with the intention
of paying it back in full and on time. This is a reasonable assumption since federal student loans cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy and missed payments will be garnered from wage/tax-refunds. Also defaulting in
student loans is detrimental to individuals’ credit ratings and ability to take out loans or obtain credit for
other purposes.
30These are the demographic groups that are reported in IPEDS’s enrollment data.
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non-black, ages 18-24, ages ≥25) to have its own price and preference parameters, αi and
βi, and omit the reference group. My model has a total of 131 parameters, not including
nuisance parameters δj and νj .
7 Model Fit and Estimation Results
The model fits the data fairly well. Tables 6-10 present the model fit for the grant and
loan components as specified in (9). Tables 11 and 12 present the model fit for demographic-
specific market shares by school type. Recall that the school market shares and dropout
rates are matched perfectly with school fixed effects δj ’s and νj ’s.
7.1 Grant and Loan Parameters
The estimated parameters and standard errors for the grant and loan functions are shown
in tables 13 and 14. Financial aid parameters are generally in line with the reduced form
results in that for-profit colleges students are systematically more likely to receive federal
student financial aid, and, to a lesser degree, receive higher amounts. These results are
consistent with the fact that for-profit colleges are known to advertise the amount of finan-
cial aid their students receive and provide hands-on assistance to students on their federal
student financial aid applications, which have been shown to be very effective in increasing
federal student financial aid uptake (Bettinger, Long, Sanbonmatsu, 2012)31. Note that
the advantage for-profit college students have over peer college students show up mostly
in the probability of obtaining (need-based) Pell grants rather than the amount received32.
31Community colleges do not make the same efforts in providing support to students with regard to
obtaining financial aid.
32Pell grants are need based and the amount awarded is based on tuition and family income, whereas
unsubsidized federal student loans are not need-based and students are free to borrow up to the maximum
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This result assuages concerns about selection on unobserved income; if conditional on ob-
servables, poorer students were selecting into for-profit colleges rather than peer colleges,
then we would also expect to see for-profit college students being awarded higher amounts
of the need-based Pell grant conditional on receiving it relative to peer college students.
Instead, my results indicate that, conditional on tuition and family income, for-profit col-
lege Pell grant recipients are only awarded slightly higher Pell grants than their peer college
counterparts (5.9%), which means that any selection on unobservables is minimal 33. In
contrast, model estimates show that for-profit college students systematically receive less
non-Pell grants34. This is most likely due to the fact that for-profit colleges rarely give out
institutional grants and may not be eligible for some local and state grants.
To illustrate the magnitude of the difference in the financial aid prospects of for-profit
college students and peer college students, consider an individual with family income (ad-
justed by family size) of $12,000, who is deciding between attending a for-profit college with
an annual tuition of $4,000 or a peer college with the same tuition. If the individual choose
to attend the for-profit college rather than the peer college, he/she would be 77% more likely
to receive Pell grants and 63% more likely to take out federal student loans; conditional on
receiving Pell grants, he/she would be awarded $230 more, and conditional on taking out
federal student loans, he/she would take out $781 more; but he/she would receive $808 less
in non-Pell grants. In expectation, this individual would receive $1,028 more in financial aid
amount.
33Assisting students on applying for need-based Pell grants would increase their probability on applying
for and receiving Pell grants but not the amount awarded conditional on applying and receiving it. On the
other hand, since students are free borrow federal student loans up to the maximum amount and for-profit
colleges have a direct hand in the application process, for-profit colleges can easily persuade their students
to take out a higher amount (for example, by filling out students’ financial aid applications for them) in
order to lower out-of-pocket costs and offset the brunt of their tuition.
34Non-Pell grants consist of institutional grants and local and state grants.
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if he/she were to attend the for-profit college rather than the peer college with the same tu-
ition. This number quantifies the magnitude by which for-profit colleges are gaming federal
student financial aid to offset their high tuition.
7.2 Preference Parameters
Tables 15, 16, and 17 present estimated price sensitivity parameters αi and preference
parameters βi for school characteristics Xj . In order to capture heterogeneous preferences,
I allow each demographic group to have its own price sensitivity and preference parameters
and omit the reference group. My estimates reveal that there exist significant variations
in preferences for school characteristics between demographic groups. First, comparing the
constant term across demographics reveal that females, blacks, and older students are less
inclined to attend college than males, non-blacks, and younger students, respectively. But
the coefficients on the for-profit college indicator variable show that the former demographic
groups have a stronger preference for for-profit colleges than the latter demographic groups.
This is consistent with what has been documented in the existing literature regarding the
demographics that for-profit colleges target. Also, it is interesting to note that although for-
profit schools and peer schools offer the same programs, they appear to have comparative
advantages in different areas. My estimates show that students prefer to attend for-profit
colleges for 2-4 years certificate programs whereas they prefer to attend peer colleges for
business programs. Furthermore, I find that an additional dollar spent on instructions by
for-profit colleges is more effective in attracting new enrollment than an additional dollar
spent by peer colleges on instructions. This result somewhat counters the criticism that
for-profit colleges are spending less on instructions and hence are providing lower quality
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education. My parameter estimates reveal that, from the students’ perspective, the higher
"effectiveness" of for-profit colleges’ instructional spending is sufficient to compensate for
the difference in instructional expenditure between the two types of colleges. So at least
from the prospective students’ point of view, for-profit colleges are not providing inferior to
peer colleges in terms of their instructional expenditures35. Higher effectiveness of for-profit
colleges’ instructional spending may be explained by the fact that for-profit colleges are
known to employ mostly part-time instructors in order to cut cost whereas peer colleges hire
mostly full-time instructors.
Preference parameters also show that all demographic groups prefer schools with online
offerings to those without36. Another way for schools to offer convenience is through having
more urban locations. The negative coefficients in front % urban indicate that students
do not like more urban campuses. Although urban campuses may be more convenient,
campuses located in cities are also more space constrained. Given that most schools already
offer online programs, the convenience offered by an urban campus is somewhat redundant
and may be overshadowed by the disutility from being space constraint.
Estimates of price sensitivity parameters αi reveal that females, blacks, and older stu-
dents are much less sensitive to price than males, non-blacks, and younger students, respec-
tively37. Lower price sensitive would also explain why these demographic groups are more
35Because I do not have post-graduation earnings data, I cannot assess the effectiveness of for-profit
colleges’ instructional expenditure in term of its effect on students post-graduating labor market performance.
Fortunately, since I’m mainly interested in students’ college choice and dropout behavior, this information
is not
36By the 2009-2010 school year most schools have already began offering online courses. Therefore, the
coefficient in front of online offerings indicator variable may be different if this model had been estimated
using data from a couple of years earlier when only a small portion of schools had adopted distance learning.
Moreover, the online coefficient may be different if I were able to observe the extensiveness of each school’s
online offerings.
37The price coefficient is positive because in the empirical specification there is a negative sign in front
of price.
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willing to attend expensive for-profit colleges. Table 19 provides the average own price elas-
ticity of demand by school type and demographics. As expected from the price sensitivity
parameters, females have lower price elasticity than males, blacks have lower price elasticity
than non-blacks, and older students have lower price elasticity than younger students. But
for-profit colleges on average have much higher price elasticity than peer colleges due to the
fact that for-profit colleges are much more expensive and that their students are much closer
to the federal student financial aid ceiling than those of peer colleges.
7.3 Other Parameters
The other parameters I estimate include σY , νL, and νH , δj , and νj , and they are reported
in table 18. The uncertainty surrounding the return to college is captured by σY and this
is set to be common across all demographic groups due to data constraints. νL and νH are
the ex-ante expected post-graduation quality indices. As expected, the group of colleges
with low dropout rates L has a higher perceived quality index than the group with high
dropout rates H. Recall that δj is the flow utility students derive from enrolling in school
j that captures factors such as the ease of applying and students’ in-school experience. On
the other hand, νj is school j’s post-graduation quality index that captures the variation in
graduation rates across schools that is not explained by the observables. I find that for-profit
colleges on average have lower δj but much higher νj than peer colleges. The former result
implies that, on average, peer colleges provide a better in-school experience to students than
for-profit colleges. The latter result indicate that students view for-profit colleges as better
than peer colleges in providing higher graduation rates and higher post-graduation earnings,
conditional on observables. This mirrors the reduced form estimates shown in table 5.
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Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of utilities students derive from each school’s observed
characteristics and unobserved quality Xjβi + νj by school type; for each school, βi is
integrated over the distribution of demographics in that school’s service area. Recall that
Xjβi+νj is the mean return to attending school j for individual i, including both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary payoffs. On average, the mean return to a for-profit college education
0.6290 is higher than that of a peer college education−5.8783, but for-profit colleges are more
variable in their mean returns (standard deviation = 7.9148)than peer colleges (standard
deviation = 5.6834).
8 Counterfactual Analyses
I use my parameter estimates to conduct the following counterfactual experiments: 1)
restrict for-profit college students’ access to federal student financial aid in terms of Pell
grants and federal student loans; 2) close down all for-profit colleges.
8.1 Restrict for-profit college students’ access to federal student financial
aid
To understand the implications of the recently proposed regulation aimed towards for-
profit colleges, I conduct a counterfactual simulation where students would not be eligible
for any Pell grants or federal student loans if they choose to attend a for-profit college
(they are still eligible for Pell grants or federal student loans if they attend peer colleges).
I find that this regulation would be successful in steering students away from for-profit
colleges as intended by policy makers for it would induce a 74% decrease in for-profit college
enrollment. However, of those who sort out of for-profit colleges only 23% will substitute
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toward a peer college, which translates into a 15% drop in the total enrollment in the market
for postsecondary vocational training.
In table 20, I decompose the effect of this regulation on enrollment by faminpp (annual
family income per person) and demographic groups (age, race, gender). Doing so separates
the enrollment response driven by the income effect from that driven by preferences (recall
that different demographic groups are allowed to have different preference parameters). Each
cell contains three entries that characterize the response of a particular demographic and
faminpp combination; the first entry is the percent change in for-profit enrollment induced
by the regulation; the second entry is the percent of those who sorted out of for-profit colleges
that switched to peer colleges; and the third entry is the percent change in total enrollment.
For example, for female students with famincpp = $10, 000, the regulation would result in
64.3% decrease in the for-profit college enrollment of this group; of those who left for-profit
college, only 6.3% would switch to a peer college; and overall, this group would suffer a
17.9% decrease in total vocational college enrollment.
Fixing famincpp and comparing the first entry of each cell (percent change in for-profit
college enrollment) across demographic groups in table 20 reveals that females are more
reluctant to leave for-profit colleges than males, blacks are more reluctant to leave for-profit
colleges than non-blacks, and older students are more reluctant to leave for-profit colleges
than younger students. This difference is attributed to stronger preference for for-profit
colleges by some demographic groups than others since fixing famincpp eliminates the
income effect. Conducting the same comparison for the second entry of each cell (percent
of those who sort out of for-profit colleges that would switch to peer colleges) reveals that
of those who sort out of for-profit colleges, blacks are less inclined to substitute to peer
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colleges than non-blacks and older students are less inclined to substitute to peer colleges
than younger students. This finding implies that peer colleges are more attractive to some
demographics than others. Finally, comparing the last entry of each cell (percent change
in total vocational college enrollment) across demographic groups conditional on famincpp
reveals that this regulation would hurt females more than males, blacks more than non-
blacks, and older students more than younger students, in terms of incurring a higher percent
drop in vocational college enrollment. Making the same comparison across famincpp while
controlling for demographics reveals that this regulation would result in a larger decline in
college enrollment among lower-income students. Differential impact across demographic
groups and income level may call into question the fairness of this regulation as certain
disadvantaged populations suffer more from this policy than others groups.
Another outcome of interest that is affected by this regulation is students’ dropout rate.
Taking away federal student financial aid from for-profit college students causes them to be-
come more credit constrained, hence making for-profit colleges effectively more expensive38.
Therefore, it would take a higher realization of postgraduation payoff to justify the cost of
continuing with college and graduating in the second period. Restricting federal student
financial aid to for-profit colleges students also affect their dropout rate by pushing some to
switch to other schools that may less suitable for them. In particular, those sorting into peer
schools would suffer an increase in dropout rates because peer schools on average are not as
good at graduating students as for-profit colleges conditional on observables. Counterfactual
simulations reveal that those who would switch from a for-profit college to a peer college
38The model presented in this paper is a partial equilibrium model and does not account for potential
responses, such as tuition adjustment, on the part of the school. However, I contend that the partial
equilibrium setting offers a good approximation of reality as all past instances of for-profit colleges losing
Title IV funding have resulted in school closure rather than tuition adjustment. Therefore, it seems that
tuition adjustment would not be the expected response to the proposed regulation.
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as a result of this regulation on average sustain a 24 percentage points increase dropout
probability. This increase is the result of mismatch and of the fact that peer colleges on
average have higher dropout rates than for-profit colleges conditional on observables. I also
find that those who would switch from a for-profit college to a different for-profit college on
average sustain a 20 percentage point increase in dropout probability. This increase is due to
both mismatch and becoming more credit constraint post-policy change. Finally, those who
would stay in the same for-profit colleges on average sustain a 6 percentage point increase
in dropout probability. This increase is solely because these students are now more credit
constrained. Therefore, even those who do not exit the vocational college market at the
college choice stage (period 1) would sort out of the market at a higher rate in the dropout
stage (period 2).
8.2 Close down all for-profit colleges
In the second counterfactual experiment, I simulate a world in which for-profit colleges do
not exist. Although this experiment is less realistic, it sheds light on the role that for-profit
colleges play in market for postsecondary vocational training. Closing down all for-profit
colleges would lead to a 22% drop in total enrollment in the market for postsecondary vo-
cational training. Only 18% of those who would otherwise attend for-profit colleges would
switched to peer colleges. This result validates the claim that for-profit colleges are indeed
serving a niche student population that does not find peer colleges to be a reasonable sub-
stitute. In other words, for-profit colleges are not stealing students away from peer colleges
but rather are targeting those who would not attend college otherwise.
I further decompose the enrollment response by demographics and famincpp (family
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income adjusted by family size) in table 21, where the first entry of each cell is the percent
change in total enrollment of a given demographic and famincpp combination, and the
second entry is the percent of for-profit college students who switched to peer colleges.
Fixing famincpp and comparing the first entry of each cell across demographics reveals
that closing down for-profit colleges induces a much larger drop in female college enrollment
than male college enrollment, a much larger drop in black college enrollment than non-
black college enrollment, and a much larger drop in older students college enrollment than
younger students college enrollment. Fixing a demographic group and comparing percent
change in total enrollment across income levels reveals that lower-income students suffer
a larger decline in college enrollment than higher-income students as the result of closing
down for-profit colleges. I conclude from these findings that the niche population for-profit
colleges serve is more likely to be female, black, older, and lower-income relative to those
who would be willing to attend peer colleges.
9 Conclusion
The for-profit college industry is a subject of continuing debate among policy makers,
but most of the dialogue thus far have been focused on the flaws of these institutions such as
higher tuition, higher dependence on federal student financial aid, and higher federal student
loan default rates. This paper examines the debate over for-profit colleges from a different
angle, by understanding the role that these institutions play the market for vocational train-
ing relative to their main competitors (peer colleges). Model estimates and counterfactual
experiments show that for-profit colleges are in fact targeting a niche student population
that would not otherwise attend peer colleges. In other words, for-profit colleges are suc-
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cessfully attracting students who otherwise would not attend college to the higher education
arena. Preference estimates exhibit significant heterogeneity across demographics. I find
that for-profit colleges cater to a student population that is more likely to be female, black,
older, and lower income compared to those who would be willing to attend peer colleges.
Counterfactual simulation shows that although regulating for-profit colleges by restricting
their students’ access to federal student financial aid would be successful in steering stu-
dents away from these schools as intended, an unintended consequence of the regulation is
that most of the students sorting out of for-profit colleges would not be substituting to peer
colleges but rather to the outside option of no college. Therefore, an undesirable side effect
of this regulation is that it would significantly depress college enrollment among the demo-
graphics that for-profit colleges target. Another undesirable side effect of this regulation is
that for those who do substitute to peer colleges as a result of the proposed regulation, they
would drop out of school at a much higher rate than they would have in the absence of the
regulation due to mismatch.
My findings shed light on several factors that attract students to for-profit colleges over
peer colleges. Model estimates show that for-profit colleges and peer colleges are differen-
tiated beyond their program offerings and tuition. First, I find that for-profit colleges and
peer colleges have comparative advantages in different programs. Whereas students prefer
peer college for business programs, they prefer for-profit colleges for 2-4 year certificate pro-
grams. Second, I find that even though for-profit colleges spend less on student instructions
they are more effective with their instructional spending than peer colleges, sufficiently so to
compensate for the difference in instructional spending between the two types of colleges39.
39Effectiveness here is evaluated in terms the utility instructional spending brings to students at the
college choice stage and while students are in school. Recall that post-graduation outcome data is not
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And finally, I find that students view for-profit colleges as better at graduating their students
and offering higher postgraduation payoffs than peer colleges, controlling for observables.
Higher graduation rate is particularly important in the market for vocational training where
most of the jobs students pursue post-graduation require the relevant degree or certification.
Beyond these differences, there remains a large utility gain attributed enrolling in for-profit
colleges for some demographics that cannot be decomposed into observables; therefore, a
more detailed analysis into the difference between for-profit and peer colleges is warranted
and planned for future research.
The findings of this paper illustrate deficiencies in the current system of peer colleges
and identify a few areas in which peer colleges can improve in order to appeal to a wider
spectrum of prospective students. Counterfactual analyses indicate that simply regulating
for-profit colleges without making any changes to peer colleges would marginalize a niche
student population that currently does not find peer colleges to be a reasonable alternative;
hence this regulation would induce a sizable population to opt out of the college option. A
more judicious policy would be to couple the regulation of for-profit colleges with efforts to
improve the current system of peer colleges. As more data become available, including post-
graduation earnings data, the model presented in this paper can also be used to compare
the cost of educating the population of for-profit college students to the economic benefit of
doing so.
available so effectiveness should not be interpreted in terms of labor market earnings.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Flow of students in and out of a school in years t and t+ 1
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of school financial and demographics
unweighted weighted by #stdts
Average for-profit peer for-profit peer
pr(Pell>0) 0.642 0.451 0.610 0.391
E(Pell | Pell>0) $4,089 $3,712 $4,094 $3,711
E(non-Pell) $762 $1,243 $840 $872
pr(loan>0) 0.678 0.285 0.764 0.237
E(loan | loan>0) $6,674 $4,245 $8,177 $4,656
tuition $7,503 $3,735 $8,684 $2,769
tuition−grant−loan -$836 -$855 -$1,021 -$871
per-stdt instr exp $2,507 $3,509 $1,920 $3,007
per-stdt non-instr exp $4,443 $4,310 $5,097 $3,449
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Figure 2: Distribution of Xjβi + νj by school type
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of enrollment, program offerings and graduation rate
unweighted weighted by #stdts
Average for-profit peer for-profit peer
enrollment/school (median) 1,668(271) 3,451(2,179) - -
%black (median) 25(17) 17(10) 30(32) 17(12)
%female (median) 75(84) 53(53) 64(70) 52(53)
%ages≥25 (median) 48(49) 41(39) 59(61) 38(37)
average (median) #programs 5(4) 38(34) 12(10) 51(54)
program length in yrs (median) 2.0(2.0) 2.4(2.2) 2.8(2.7) 2.4(2.2)
graduation rate % (median) 51(51) 30(25) 35(30) 21(18)
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Table 3: School-level reduced form estimates of grant components in (9)
log(
pr(Pellj>0)
1+pr(Pellj>0)
) log(Pellj |Pellj>0) log(nonPellj)
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons -.6250 .1155 1.1239 .0278 -.6092 .1775
1(for-profit) .4102 .0546 .0552 .0152 -1.2070 .0875
log(tuition in K) .2629 .0331 .0221 .0079 .6822 .0461
% black 1.2547 .1042 .0691 .0277 -.3468 .1447
% female .5577 .0897 .0287 .0282 -.9157 .1665
% 18-24 -.6625 .1411 .2045 .0351 .2285 .2098
Adj. R2 .3086 .0376 .2003
a All monetary variables in thousands
b Dependent variables derived from solving (9) for the observables.
Table 4: School-level reduced form estimates of loan components in (9)
log(
pr(Loanj>0)
1+pr(Loanj>0)
) log(Loanj |Loanj>0)
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons -2.192 .1583 1.556 .0488
1(for-profit) .7445 .0841 .1173 .0248
log(tuition in K) 1.3060 .0546 .2245 .0154
% black .4619 .1543 -.0902 .0481
% female .3961 .1285 -.1805 .0439
% 18-24 -.7529 .1825 -.1715 .0546
Adj. R2 .5382 .2028
a All monetary variables in thousands
b Dependent variables derived from solving (9) for the observables.
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Table 5: School-level linear probability model of graduation rate
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons .2021 .0104 .3777 .0296 .4030 .0374
1(for-profit) .2407 .0119 .0688 .0173 .0733 .0176
tuition (in K) .0069 .0018 .0091 .0020 .0089 .0020
grant (in K) .0056 .0025 .0030 .0026 .0048 .0027
loan (in K) -.0110 .0021 -.0029 .0022 -.0034 .0022
instr. exp (in K) .0264 .0028 .0157 .0025 .0153 .0025
non-instr. exp (in K) -.0027 .0020 .0009 .0017 .0007 .0017
1(online) -.0677 .0154 -.0689 .0153
% urban -.0006 .0001 -.0004 .0001
# campuses -.0002 .0004 -.0002 .0004
1(1yr certificates) .0555 .0093 .0545 .0092
1(1-2yr certificates) .0384 .0137 .0396 .0136
1(associate deg) -.1042 .0132 -.1045 .0133
1(2-4yr certificates) .0349 .0104 .0319 .0105
1(Bachelor’s deg) -.0147 .0151 -.0143 .0151
1(beauty prgms) -.0235 .0097 -.0192 .0099
1(health prgms) .0680 .0133 .0695 .0138
1(business prgms) -.0740 .0150 -.0743 .0150
total# prgrams -.0008 .0002 -.0009 .0002
% black -.0788 .0192
% female -.0207 .0232
% 18-24 -.0212 .0286
Adj. R2 .2853 .4220 .4267
a All monetary variables in thousands
b Dependent variable = graduation rate.
c instr. exp = instructional expenditure per student.
d non-instr. exp = non-instructional expenditure per student.
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Table 6: Model fit for grant and loan components in (9) by school type
for-profit peer
pr(Pellj > 0) (model) 0.641 0.452
pr(Pellj > 0) (data) 0.642 0.451
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (model) 4.075 3.708
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (data) 4.089 3.712
E(nonPellj) (model) 0.770 1.241
E(nonPellj) (data) 0.762 1.243
pr(Loanj > 0) (model) 0.678 0.285
pr(Loanj > 0) (data) 0.678 0.285
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (model) 6.678 4.243
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (data) 6.674 4.245
a All monetary variables in thousands
Table 7: Model fit for grant and loan components in (9) by tuition quartiles
tuition 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
pr(Pellj > 0) (model) 0.431 0.485 0.597 0.611
pr(Pellj > 0) (data) 0.429 0.497 0.607 0.605
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (model) 3.668 3.740 4.024 4.069
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (data) 3.660 3.738 4.028 4.079
E(nonPellj) (model) 0.709 1.012 0.908 1.578
E(nonPellj) (data) 0.723 0.925 0.893 1.592
pr(Loanj > 0) (model) 0.161 0.321 0.621 0.731
pr(Loanj > 0) (data) 0.158 0.310 0.624 0.734
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (model) 3.421 4.184 6.035 7.514
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (data) 3.432 4.136 5.981 7.670
a All monetary variables in thousands
Table 8: Model fit for grant and loan components in (9) by %black quartiles
% black 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
pr(Pellj > 0) (model) 0.498 0.492 0.524 0.628
pr(Pellj > 0) (data) 0.491 0.478 0.517 0.651
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (model) 3.845 3.843 3.812 3.968
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (data) 3.895 3.804 3.804 3.986
E(nonPellj) (model) 1.139 1.125 1.031 0.843
E(nonPellj) (data) 1.142 1.140 1.016 0.836
pr(Loanj > 0) (model) 0.457 0.425 0.434 0.508
pr(Loanj > 0) (data) 0.449 0.426 0.444 0.508
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (model) 5.357 5.154 5.338 5.301
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (data) 5.367 5.297 5.345 5.209
a All monetary variables in thousands
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Table 9: Model fit for grant and loan components in (9) by %female quartiles
% female 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
pr(Pellj > 0) (model) 0.475 0.446 0.615 0.640
pr(Pellj > 0) (data) 0.458 0.450 0.602 0.627
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (model) 3.785 3.748 3.846 4.204
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (data) 3.761 3.756 3.891 4.096
E(nonPellj) (model) 1.194 1.105 1.118 0.724
E(nonPellj) (data) 1.205 1.107 1.203 0.619
pr(Loanj > 0) (model) 0.403 0.264 0.505 0.658
pr(Loanj > 0) (data) 0.396 0.265 0.523 0.641
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (model) 5.034 4.425 5.653 6.157
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (data) 5.063 4.428 5.653 6.075
a All monetary variables in thousands
Table 10: Model fit for grant and loan components in (9) by %age 18-24 quartiles
% ages 18-24 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
pr(Pellj > 0) (model) 0.597 0.578 0.507 0.475
pr(Pellj > 0) (data) 0.606 0.584 0.497 0.451
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (model) 3.801 3.946 3.884 3.889
E(Pellj |Pellj>0) (data) 3.766 3.937 3.897 3.904
E(nonPellj) (model) 0.934 0.933 0.928 1.351
E(nonPellj) (data) 0.924 0.930 0.918 1.362
pr(Loanj > 0) (model) 0.548 0.462 0.375 0.454
pr(Loanj > 0) (data) 0.551 0.454 0.374 0.447
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (model) 5.716 5.028 5.097 5.410
E(Loanj |Loanj>0) (data) 5.614 5.078 5.188 5.339
a All monetary variables in thousands
Table 11: Model fit for demographic-specific market shares by school type
model data
black (for-profit) 0.0029 0.0029
black (peer) 0.0341 0.0346
non-black (for-profit) 0.0022 0.0022
non-black (peer) 0.0315 0.0313
female (for-profit) 0.0033 0.0034
female (peer) 0.0332 0.0330
male (for-profit) 0.0012 0.0012
male (peer) 0.0279 0.0280
age 18-24 (for-profit) 0.0037 0.0038
age 18-24 (peer) 0.0584 0.0586
age ≥ 25 (for-profit) 0.0017 0.0017
age ≥ 25(peer) 0.0179 0.0176
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Table 12: Model fit for demographic-specific market shares by school type
model data
black female (for-profit) 0.0044 0.0046
black female (peer) 0.0416 0.0418
black male (for-profit) 0.0018 0.0018
black male (peer) 0.0324 0.0325
non-black female (for-profit) 0.0032 0.0032
non-black female (peer) 0.0343 0.0340
non-black male (for-profit) 0.0012 0.0011
non-black male (peer) 0.0284 0.0288
age 18-24 female (for-profit) 0.0056 0.0057
age 18-24 female (peer) 0.0649 0.0651
age 18-24 male (for-profit) 0.0018 0.0019
age 18-24 male (peer) 0.0525 0.0526
age ≥ 25 female (for-profit) 0.0028 0.0025
age ≥ 25 female (peer) 0.0224 0.0224
age ≥ 25 male (for-profit) 8.9e-4 8.9e-4
age ≥ 25 male (peer) 0.0130 0.0131
Table 13: Structural estimates of grant components in (9)
pr(Pellj > 0) E(Pellj |Pellj>0) E(nonPellj)
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons 2.585 0.841 1.316 0.348 -0.283 0.084
1(for-profit) 0.875 0.079 0.059 0.012 -1.001 0.246
log(tuition in K) 0.094 0.024 0.032 0.010 0.647 0.102
log(famincpp) -1.528 0.440 -0.017 0.003 -0.148 0.034
a All monetary variables in thousands
b famincpp = family income per person (discounted by family size)
Table 14: Structural estimates of loan components in (9)
pr(Loanj > 0) E(Loanj |Loanj>0)
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons -0.914 0.214 1.767 0.450
1(for-profit) 0.741 0.311 0.175 0.069
log(tuition in K) 1.238 0.385 0.218 0.047
log(famincpp) -0.740 0.100 -0.268 0.130
a All monetary variables in thousands
b famincpp = family income per person (discounted by family size)
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Table 15: Price and preference parameters estimates by demographics: αi, βi
female male
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons -1.699 0.408 -0.725 0.243
αi 0.023 0.010 0.219 0.020
1(for-profit) 1.690 0.214 -0.911 0.100
s (K) 0.033 0.018 0.003 0.001
s*1(for-profit) (K) 0.090 0.042 0.070 0.028
e (K) 0.045 0.019 0.005 0.004
% campus w online courses 0.303 0.046 0.174 0.011
% urban of campus locations -0.009 0.002 -0.014 0.012
% urban*1(for-profit) -0.026 0.006 -0.0003 0.001
total # of prgm 0.021 0.007 0.026 0.005
offer 1yr certificate prgm 0.144 0.071 0.016 0.010
offer Associate degree prgm 0.149 0.003 0.523 0.048
offer 2-4yrs certificate prgm -0.575 0.097 -0.130 0.110
offer 2-4yrs certificate*1(for-profit) 0.301 0.150 0.772 0.081
1(offer beauty prgm) 0.339 0.061 -0.312 0.079
1(offer health prgm) 0.698 0.250 0.141 0.081
1(offer business prgm) 0.547 0.226 0.797 0.100
1(offer business prgm)*1(for-profit) -0.379 0.070 -0.112 0.045
a All monetary variables in thousands
b s = instructional expenditure; e = non-instructional expenditure.
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Table 16: Price and preference parameters estimates by demographics: αi, βi
black non-black
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons -2.514 0.460 0.044 0.306
αi 0.024 0.009 0.348 0.034
1(for-profit) 4.478 1.006 3.154 0.675
s (K) 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.021
s*1(for-profit) (K) 0.086 0.030 0.084 0.039
e (K) 0.038 0.009 0.038 0.010
% campus w online courses 0.065 0.031 0.210 0.014
% urban of campus locations -0.018 0.036 -0.014 0.001
% urban*1(for-profit) -0.033 0.019 -0.005 0.004
total # of prgm 0.026 0.005 0.021 0.003
offer 1yr certificate prgm 0.111 0.038 0.135 0.069
offer Associate degree prgm 0.137 0.036 0.257 0.090
offer 2-4yrs certificate prgm -0.438 0.108 -0.315 0.087
offer 2-4yrs certificate*1(for-profit) 0.401 0.155 0.013 0.026
1(offer beauty prgm) 0.029 0.027 -0.066 0.050
1(offer health prgm) 0.527 0.066 0.467 0.081
1(offer business prgm) 0.581 0.141 0.486 0.060
1(offer business prgm)*1(for-profit) -0.278 0.074 -0.294 0.090
a All monetary variables in thousands
b s = instructional expenditure; e = non-instructional expenditure.
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Table 17: Price and preference parameters estimates by demographics: αi, βi
age 18-24 age> 25
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
cons 2.673 0.900 -1.673 0.370
αi 0.257 0.067 0.052 0.010
1(for-profit) 1.389 0.632 1.821 0.551
s (K) 0.017 0.100 0.033 0.010
s*1(for-profit) (K) 0.070 0.030 0.093 0.017
e (K) 0.020 0.002 0.047 0.019
% campus w online courses 0.404 0.148 0.211 0.101
% urban of campus locations 0.008 0.003 -0.029 0.005
% urban*1(for-profit) -0.015 0.006 -0.016 0.002
total # of prgm 0.021 0.005 0.029 0.005
offer 1yr certificate prgm 0.132 0.026 0.198 0.062
offer Associate degree prgm 0.356 0.105 0.197 0.090
offer 2-4yrs certificate prgm -0.436 0.046 0.498 0.042
offer 2-4yrs certificate*1(for-profit) 0.665 0.150 0.353 0.103
1(offer beauty prgm) 0.216 0.079 0.049 0.021
1(offer health prgm) 0.258 0.100 0.638 0.095
1(offer business prgm) 0.534 0.135 0.602 0.203
1(offer business prgm)*1(for-profit) -0.370 0.031 -0.411 0.160
a All monetary variables in thousands
b s = instructional expenditure; e = non-instructional expenditure.
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Table 18: Estimates for other parameters
parameter estimate S.E.
σY 6.300 4.010
νL 0.929 0.010
νH -8.861 0.394
mean δj (for-profit) -6.003 -
mean δj (peer) -5.317 -
mean νj (for-profit) -3.803 -
mean νj (peer) -12.059 -
Table 19: Average own price elasticity of demand
for-profit peer
average 3.204 1.751
average (female) 2.920 1.506
average (male) 4.116 2.196
average (black) 1.571 1.173
average (non-black) 4.034 2.084
average (age 18-24) 3.661 1.968
average (age ≥25) 2.855 1.602
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Table 20: Restrict for-profit college students’ access to federal student financial aid: the
entries in each cell are respectively: 1) percent change in for-profit enrollment, 2) percent of
those who sorted out of for-profit colleges that switched to peer colleges, 3) percent change
in total enrollment.
famincpp $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000
Female
-79.9 -72.0 -64.3 -57.3 -51.3
14.9 10.2 7.2 6.3 5.5
-24.7 -22.6 -20.2 -17.9 -15.9
Male
-91.4 -86.5 -81.0 -75.5 -70.2
16.8 10.2 7.0 5.3 4.4
-11.8 -11.4 -10.5 -9.5 -8.6
Black
-51.9 -46.1 -41.2 -37.0 -33.4
7.0 5.8 5.2 4.8 4.5
-20.6 -19.4 -17.8 -16.2 -14.7
Non-black
-94.7 -91.4 -87.4 -83.1 -78.7
17.2 11.3 8.3 6.5 5.5
-18.1 -17.1 -15.5 -13.8 -12.2
Age 18-24
-96.4 -93.7 -90.2 -86.2 -81.8
25.4 17.0 12.7 10.2 8.7
-13.7 -13.1 -11.8 -10.4 -9.1
Age ≥25
-72.8 -65.0 -58.1 -52.1 -46.9
5.4 4.3 3.7 3.4 3.2
-26.0 -23.4 -20.9 -18.6 -16.6
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Table 21: Close down all for-profit colleges: the entries in each cell are respectively: 1)
percent change in total enrollment 2) percent of for-profit college students who switched to
peer colleges
famincpp $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000
Female -31.5 -31.9 -31.7 -31.4 -31.113.2 8.8 6.7 5.6 5.0
Male -13.0 -13.3 -13.1 -12.7 -12.315.9 9.5 6.4 4.9 4.1
Black -40.0 -42.2 -43.3 -43.9 -44.26.3 5.4 4.9 4.6 4.4
Non-black -19.2 -18.8 -17.8 -16.6 -15.616.8 10.9 7.9 6.2 5.2
Age 18-24 -14.2 -14.0 -13.1 -12.1 -11.125.1 16.8 12.5 10.0 8.5
Age ≥25 -35.7 -36.0 -35.9 -35.6 -35.35.3 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.6
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